



Rights-based fisheries management:

Many designs, many options



Overview

- Designing a harvest-based system: “4+1”
 - 4 steps of design
 - +
 - 1 dose of reality
- Two tuna fisheries and the changes that have occurred
 - Australian Southern Bluefin Tuna ITQs
 - PNA Purse Seine Vessel Day Scheme
- Closing comments



Designing a harvest-based management system

“4+1”



The 4 Steps

- Specification of objectives
- Selection of management instruments(s)
- Selection of management entity/s
- Specification of the harvest management regime



Step 1: Specification of objectives

- What do you want to use the fishery to do?
 - Sustainability = limit on how much is caught
 - Economic and fiscal benefit = overcapacity will have to go
 - Social purposes = economic inefficiency will be present
 - Customary and/or traditional practices = contemporary conflicts

Any combination of these involves trade-offs



Step 2: Selection of Management Instrument(s)

- What management tools are you going to use?
 - Technical measures
 - Taxes or fees
 - Access limits
 - Shares of catch
- What are the implications of each tool?
- What are implications of the combination you choose?



Step 3: Selection of management entity/s

- Who is responsible for doing what?
- Is management going to be provided by
 - the state?
 - a separate agency or institution that delivers management?
 - a private entity such as a collective or cooperative?



Step 4: Specification of the harvest management regime

- Who is the holder of the rights?
 - Groups of stakeholders? Individuals?
 - Is it some combination of both?
- What is the duration of the rights?
- Are the rights transferable?
- Are the rights divisible?
 - If so, to what extent? In block, or small units?
- What is the quality of the share?
 - Enforceability?



The “+1” Step = Context

- Governance and political situation
 - What is the political context in which the fishery operates?
- Rule of law
 - To what extent is there rule of law?
- Transparency and equality
 - Is there transparency and equality amongst all stakeholders?
- Accountability
 - With rights come responsibilities, but can these be upheld?

Will the system be as good in practice as it looks in reality?



Two tuna fisheries

Australia - Southern Bluefin Tuna Individual Transferable Quota 1984

Parties to the Nauru Agreement – Vessel Day Scheme 2010



Australia – Southern Bluefin Tuna (1984)

- Motivation for change: crisis
 - Overfishing
 - Overcapitalization
 - Profitability

Outcomes of the Individual Transferable Quota system

- Overfishing stopped
- Consolidation
- Value addition to increase profitability
 - Change operations - catching to ranching
 - Change in products - canned to Japanese sashimi market



Parties to the Nauru Agreement: Vessel Day Scheme

- Purpose –
 - To limit and reduce catches of target tuna species
 - To limit the number of vessels operating in the waters of the PNA.
 - To increase the rate of return to the Parties from fishing activities
- Operation:
 - Total allocation of fishing days per year set and apportioned
 - Purchase and trade of days fishing at sea
- Outcomes:
 - Catches, vessels limited
 - Countries receiving money



Closing comments



Recapitulation

- Not one design
 - One or more objectives
 - Combinations of management instruments
 - Various roles and responsibilities held by various stakeholders
 - Infinite combinations of the 5 elements of the harvest management regime
- Process as well as content



Muchas gracias.
Thank you.

Rebecca.Metzner@FAO.org